Interactive Verifiable Polynomial Evaluation by Sahraei, Saeid et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
04
30
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
C]
  9
 Ju
l 2
01
9
Interactive Verifiable Polynomial Evaluation
Saeid Sahraei∗ Mohammad Ali Maddah-Ali† Salman Avestimehr‡
Abstract
Cloud computing platforms have created the possibility for computationally limited users to
delegate demanding tasks to strong but untrusted servers. Verifiable computing algorithms help build
trust in such interactions by enabling the server to provide a proof of correctness of his results which
the user can check very efficiently. In this paper, we present a doubly-efficient interactive algorithm
for verifiable polynomial evaluation. Unlike the mainstream literature on verifiable computing, the
soundness of our algorithm is information-theoretic and cannot be broken by a computationally
unbounded server. By relying on basic properties of error correcting codes, our algorithm enforces
a dishonest server to provide false results to problems which become progressively easier to verify.
After roughly log d rounds, the user can verify the response of the server against a look-up table
that has been pre-computed during an initialization phase. For a polynomial of degree d, we achieve
a user complexity of O(dǫ), a server complexity of O(d1+ǫ), a round complexity of O(log d) and an
initialization complexity of O(d1+ǫ).
1 Introduction
The recent rise in cloud computing platforms has created an increasing demand for verifiable computing
protocols. A commercial server that sells its computation power to the users, is incentivized to return
false results, if by doing so it can reduce its computation overhead and oversell its services. Therefore,
a user who delegates a computationally demanding task to a server must be able to verify that the
results are indeed correct. Verifiable computing algorithms require the server to send a “proof” to the
user along with the results of computation [14]. By investigating this proof, a user is convinced with
high probability that the server is honest. Clearly, a practical verifiable computing algorithm must be
“doubly-efficient” [16]: it must have a super-efficient verifier (user) and an efficient prover (server). Put
differently, if the complexity of computing the original function is χ, the prover’s complexity must be
comparable to χ, and the verifier’s complexity must be substantially smaller than χ.
The study of verifiable computing has led to novel cryptographic algorithms which are either
applicable to arbitrary functions [15, 25] or tailored to computation of a specific function [13, 9]. The
former has led to the development of Quadratic Arithmetic Programs and zkSNARKs for arithmetic
circuits, while the latter has resulted in highly efficient and easy-to-implement algorithms that can
be applied to, say, polynomial evaluation or matrix multiplication. Despite their enormous success,
the security of cryptographic algorithms depends on hardness assumptions about certain mathematical
problems. Algorithmic breakthroughs or technological advancements may falsify these assumptions at
any time. This creates a demand for verifiable computing algorithms which remain secure in the face of
computationally unbounded provers.
Our objective in this work is to design an information-theoretic algorithm for verifiable polynomial
evaluation. Information-theoretic in this context means that the soundness of the algorithm is
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fundamental, and does not rely on hardness assumptions. An example of how such an algorithm can
be applied in practice is blockchain networks where the capacity to verify a newly mined block against
the history of the transactions is the distinguishing factor between a light node and a full node. This
block verification process can generally be modelled as an instance of polynomial evaluation [20]. The
full nodes can thus convince the light nodes of the correctness of a block via a verifiable polynomial
evaluation algorithm.
Our setup is very similar to the classical notion of interactive proof systems, with one subtle difference:
we allow for a one-time initialization or pre-processing phase during which the verifier may perform a
computationally heavy task. This is acceptable because in the verifiable computing literature, it is
generally assumed [14, 9, 13] that after this initialization phase, the verifier and the prover will engage in
evaluating the function at many inputs. Therefore, this initialization cost amortizes over many rounds
and can be neglected.
1.1 Setting and Objective. Consider a polynomial of degree d−1, f(x) = a0+a1x+ · · ·+ad−1xd−1.
A verifier wishes to evaluate this polynomial at x ∈ {x1, x2, · · · } with the help of a prover. Similar to
[16], we require the algorithm to be doubly-efficient with a small round complexity. On the other
hand, we deviate from the classical notion of proof systems and allow the verifier to perform a one-time
computationally heavy task. We impose the following performance criteria on the algorithm.
• Efficient initialization: the verifier is allowed to perform a one-time initialization phase and
store the outcome for future reference. Although this phase is run only once, its complexity should
be comparable to the complexity of computing f(x).
• Super-Efficient verifier: for each x ∈ {x1, x2, · · · }, the complexity of the verifier should be
negligible compared to the complexity of computing f(x).
• Efficient prover: for each x ∈ {x1, x2, · · · }, the complexity of the prover should be comparable
to the complexity of computing f(x).
• Small round complexity: the number of rounds of interaction between the prover and the
verifier must be polylogarithmic in d.
• Completeness: if the prover is honest, the verifier should accept his results with probability 1.
• (Information-theoretic) soundness: If the prover is dishonest, the verifier should be able to
reject his results with probability at least 12 .
1.2 Related Work. An interactive proof (IP) system [17, 4] is an interactive protocol that enables a
prover to convince a computationally-limited verifier of the correctness of a statement. It is well-known
that IPs are very strong tools: any problem in PSPACE admits an interactive proof with polynomial
complexity for the verifier [23, 31]. Nevertheless, the recent rise in cloud computing platforms has led to
several intriguing questions surrounding the practicality of such algorithms. In particular, the provers
in [23, 31] run in exponential time, making them unfit for real-world commercial servers. The concept
of doubly-efficient interactive proofs was first introduced in [16] followed by [28, 27]. In this context,
“doubly-efficient” means that the prover must run in polynomial time and the verifier must be “super-
efficient”, i.e., his complexity must be close to linear in the size of the problem. Unfortunately, in many
practical scenarios, even linear complexity is unacceptable for the verifier. Concrete examples of this are
when the problem itself can be solved in linear time, however, due to the sheer size of the problem the
verifier is incapable of performing the computation alone. In such cases, a high-degree polynomial-time
prover is clearly impractical too.
A closely related line of work is Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCP) [6, 7, 3, 8, 26], where the
prover is required to commit to a proof which is usually too long for the verifier to process. The verifier
can then sample this proof randomly in a few locations and be convinced of the correctness of the proof
with high probability. The celebrated PCP theorem [1, 2] states that any problem in NP admits a PCP
with verifier complexity that is polylogarithmic in the size of the problem. However, from a practical
perspective, it is not clear how this initial commitment can be implemented. One possibility is to rely
on Merkle commitments with the help of collision-resistant hash functions and assume that the prover
is computationally limited. Alternatively, the prover can send the entire proof to a trusted third-party
which will be the point of contact for the verifier. However, these approaches alter the setup, and more
importantly make strong assumptions such as the existence of trusted third parties or computational
limitation of the prover. Other PCP-based proof systems that are secure against computationally limited
provers include [19] and [24].
The notion of verifiable computing was introduced in [14]. Motivated by practical considerations,
in a verifiable computing setting one assumes that a computationally limited verifier (user) delegates
a task to a prover (server). The prover must then cooperate with the verifier in computation of the
function in such a way that the verifier remains efficient and convinced of the validity of the results.
There are subtle differences between this model and the classical notion of proof systems. In particular,
it is usually assumed that the verifier may run a one-time initialization phase that is computationally
expensive. The cost of this computation is amortized over many runs of the algorithms, corresponding
to the evaluation of the same function over many different inputs. In Gennaro’s framework [14], the
function to be computed is characterized by its boolean circuit which is evaluated with the help of
Yao’s garbled circuits [32, 21] and Fully Homomorphic Encryption. In a subsequent work [15, 25] which
led to the development of several zkSNARKs (zero-knowledge non-interactive arguments of knowledge)
[18, 22, 10, 30], it was suggested to represent arbitrary arithmetic and logical circuits as Quadratic
Arithmetic Programs and Quadratic Span Programs which are then evaluated at encrypted values to
produce proofs of correctness. These algorithms can be proven secure against provers who are not
powerful enough to reverse such encryptions.
Recently, a new line of work in the cryptography community has focused on the verifiable evaluation
of specific functions such as high-degree polynomials or multiplication of large matrices. These functions
serve as building blocks for many applications such as machine learning and blockchain. Advances in this
area has led to extremely efficient algorithms for verifiable polynomial evaluation [9, 13, 5, 12], matrix
multiplication [33, 13], and modular exponentiation [11]. Unfortunately, similar to the generic verifiable
computing algorithms discussed above, these algorithms rely on unproven cryptographic assumptions.
To overcome this limitations, recent efforts have focused on information-theoretic verifiable polynomial
evaluation algorithms which are secure against unbounded adversarial provers [29]. Nevertheless, to
achieve information-theoretic security, [29] pays a significant cost in terms of the complexity of the
verifier. While the cryptographic approaches lead to logarithmic or even constant verification time, the
verifier in [29] runs in O(
√
d).
1.3 Main Results. we design an information-theoretic verifiable polynomial evaluation algorithm
which is super-efficient for the verifier and efficient for the prover. Even though our algorithm is
interactive, the number of interactions only grows logarithmically as a function of the degree of the
polynomial. Similar to other verifiable computing algorithms, in our setting the verifier performs a one-
time initialization phase whose complexity is comparable to the complexity of evaluating the polynomial
once.
Theorem 1.1. There exists a public-coin verifiable polynomial evaluation algorithm with initialization
complexity of O(d1+ǫ), verifier complexity of O(dǫ), prover complexity of O(d1+ǫ), and round complexity
of O(log d) which satisfies the completeness and soundness properties as defined in Section 1.1.
1.4 An Overview of the Algorithm. Similar in nature to many other interactive proof systems
[23, 6, 8], the core idea behind our algorithm is to enforce a dishonest prover to provide false results on
problems that become progressively easier to verify throughout the interactions. To be more specific, let
us look at a simple example where the polynomial f(x) = a0 + a1x+ · · · + ad−1xd−1 is to be evaluated
where d is even. Suppose the prover provides a false answer fˆ(x) 6= f(x). The protocol then requires the
prover to provide his evaluation of two more functions, namely f (0)(y) = a0+a2y+a4y
2+ · · ·+ad−2y
d
2
−1
and f (1)(y) = a1 + a3y + a5y
2 + · · · + ad−1y
d
2
−1, both evaluated at y = x2. Obviously, we must
have f (0)(y) + xf (1)(y) = f(x), which can be easily checked by the verifier. Since fˆ(x) 6= f(x), the
prover must either provide fˆ (0)(y) 6= f (0)(y) or fˆ (1)(y) 6= f (1)(y) in order to pass the verification
fˆ (0)(y) + xfˆ (1)(y) = fˆ(x). Voilà, the prover has been forced to lie again. Note also that the degree of
f (0) and f (1) is only d/2. The verifier cloud then climb down the branches of this binary tree, and after
log d rounds, verify the correctness of all the constant polynomials corresponding to the leaves of the
tree. But this would take him O(d) to accomplish. Instead, he computes a random linear combination
αfˆ (0)(y)+βfˆ (1)(y) and uses this as the reference point for the next iteration. Provided that these random
coefficients are selected over sufficiently large sets, we will have αfˆ (0)(y)+βfˆ (1)(y) 6= αf (0)(y)+βf (1)(y)
with high probability and the error will propagate to the next iteration of the algorithm. After log d
iterations, the verifier is left with a constant polynomial that he needs to verify. We note that this
algorithm is inspired by the Probabilistically Checkable Proof of Proximity recently proposed in [6]
(despite this, our algorithm is clearly not a PCP but an IP).
As it turns out, the fact that the degree of the polynomial decreases by a factor of 2 at each
iteration does not immediately translate to an easier verification. Unfortunately, each coefficient of the
newly constructed polynomial is now a linear combination of two coefficients in the original polynomial.
Therefore, evaluating the new polynomial from scratch still takes O(d). In particular, after log d
iterations, we are left with a constant which is a (random) linear combination of all the d coefficients
of the original polynomial. To help the verifier ensure the validity of this linear combination, we allow
for an initialization phase, whereby the verifier computes all the possible outcomes of the algorithm and
stores them in a look-up table in his memory. For this to be feasible, we need the random coefficients to
be selected from a set that is not too large. By properly choosing the size of this set, we guarantee that
the look-up table is of size O(d1+ǫ) and that it can be computed in time O(d1+ǫ). The verifier can then
check the validity of the constant polynomial at the end of log d iterations by comparing the returned
result to the corresponding entry in the look-up table.
2 Interactive Verifiable Polynomial Evaluation
In this section we describe an interactive algorithm for verifiable evaluation of a function f(x) =
a0 + a1x + · · · + ad−1xd−1 over members of a finite field F. The coefficients a0, · · · , ad−1 are arbitrary
members of F.
2.1 Preliminaries. Let η > 1 be an integer and let c > 1, c ∈ R be such that cη ∈ Z. These two
are design parameters that can depend on d in general. Throughout this section, we will assume that c
is a constant, and that η grows at most polylogarithmically with d. Let L ⊆ F be a set of size cη and
let H ⊂ L be of size η. Let us represent the members of L as L = {α0, · · · , αcη−1}. Without loss of
generality, we can assume H = {α0, · · · , αη−1}. The sets L and H are publicly known. For i ∈ [0 : η−1]
define
Zi(β) =
∏
j∈[0:η−1]\{i}
β − αj
αi − αj . (2.1)
Note that for i ∈ [0 : η−1] and k ∈ [0 : η−1] we have Zi(αk) = 1 if i = k and 0 if i 6= k. Let r = log dlog η . To
simplify the matters, we assume r is an integer (otherwise, we will set r = ⌈ log dlog η ⌉). Iteratively, define the
polynomials g(b1,··· ,bℓ−1)(α, x) and f (b1,··· ,bℓ)(x), for ℓ ∈ [0 : r] and (b1, · · · , bℓ) ∈ [0 : cη− 1]ℓ as follows. If
f (b1,··· ,bℓ−1)(x) = e0 + e1x+ e2x
2 + · · · then
g(b1,··· ,bℓ−1)(α, x) = Z0(α)[e0 + eηx+ e2ηx
2 + · · · ] (2.2)
+ Z1(α)[e1 + eη+1x+ e2η+1x
2 + · · · ] (2.3)
+ · · · (2.4)
+ Zη−1(α)[eη−1 + e2η−1x+ e3η−1x
2 + · · · ], (2.5)
and
f (b1,··· ,bℓ)(x) = g(b1,··· ,bℓ−1)(αbℓ , x). (2.6)
As the starting point of the iteration, let f (b1,··· ,bℓ−1)(x) = f(x) for ℓ = 1. Note that g(b1,··· ,bℓ)(α, x) is a
polynomial of degree η − 1 as a function of α. Furthermore, note that
∑
bℓ∈[0:η−1]
xbℓf (b1,··· ,bℓ)(xη) = f (b1,··· ,bℓ−1)(x). (2.7)
Define h(b1, · · · , br) as
h(b1, · · · , br) = f (b1,··· ,br)(x), ∀(b1, · · · , bℓ) ∈ [0 : cη − 1]ℓ. (2.8)
Since f (b1,··· ,br)(x) is a constant function of x, h(b1, · · · , br) only depends on (b1, · · · , br) and not x.
2.2 The Initialization Phase. In the initialization phase, the verifier computes and stores
h(b1, · · · , br) in a look-up table for all possible (b1, · · · , br) ∈ [0 : cη − 1]r. In total, the number of
evaluation points is
λ = (c · η)r = cr · d. (2.9)
We will now describe an algorithm for efficient computation of the look-up table. We will show that due
to the recursive structure of h(·), its evaluation at all λ points can be computed in O(cr · d · η).
2.2.1 Efficient Computation of the Look-up Table. A naive approach to obtaining the λ = cr ·d
entries of the look-up table is to compute them individually, which would take O(λ · d). However, due
to the recursive structure of the function h(·), we can be much more efficient. Specifically, let a(b1,··· ,bℓ)i
be the coefficient of xi in f (b1,··· ,bℓ)(x) for each ℓ ∈ [0 : r] and all (b1, · · · , bℓ) ∈ [0 : cη− 1]ℓ. We have the
following recursion
a
(b1,··· ,bℓ)
i =
∑
j∈[0:η−1]
a
(b1,··· ,bℓ−1)
j+iη Zj(αbℓ), ∀i ∈ [0 :
d
ηℓ
− 1] , (b1, · · · , bℓ) ∈ [0 : cη − 1]ℓ, (2.10)
Algorithm 1 Efficient Computation of the Look-up Table
Input: (a0, · · · , ad−1), η, c, L = {α0, · · · , αcη−1}.
Output: The look-up table h
1: a
()
i = ai, for i ∈ [0 : d− 1].
2: Zi,j =
∏
k∈[0:η−1]\{i}
αj−αk
αi−αk
for i ∈ [0 : η − 1] and j ∈ [0 : cη − 1].
3: r = ⌈ log dlog η⌉.
4: for ℓ ∈ [1 : r] do
5: a
(b1,··· ,bℓ)
i =
∑
j∈[0:η−1] a
(b1,··· ,bℓ−1)
j+iη Zj,bℓ for all i ∈ [0 : dηℓ − 1] and (b1, · · · , bℓ) ∈ [0 : cη − 1]ℓ.
6: end for
7: h(b1, · · · , br) = a(b1,··· ,br)0 for all (b1, · · · , br) ∈ [0 : cη − 1]r.
8: return h.
for all ℓ ∈ [1 : r]. Furthermore, for ℓ = 0, we define a(b1,··· ,bℓ)i = ai. When ℓ = r, the polynomial
f (b1,··· ,br)(x) is of degree zero and is equal to a
(b1,··· ,br)
0 . Therefore, we have
h(b1, · · · , br) = a(b1,··· ,br)0 . (2.11)
In order to compute h(b1, · · · , br), we start by computing a table of size cη2 that stores all Zi(αj),
for i ∈ [0 : η − 1] and j ∈ [0 : cη − 1] 1. Afterwards, we iteratively compute the values of a(b1,··· ,bℓ)i
until we reach the leaves of the tree which give us h(b1, · · · , br). Since we have pre-computed the values
of Zi(αj), finding each a
(b1,··· ,bℓ)
i based on (2.10) only takes O(η). At the ℓ
th level of the tree, we must
compute a
(b1,··· ,bℓ)
i for all (b1, · · · , bℓ) ∈ [0 : cη − 1]ℓ and all i ∈ [0 : dηℓ − 1]. Therefore, the computation
at level ℓ takes O((c · η)ℓ · d
ηℓ
· η) = O(cℓ · d · η) operations. As a result, the entire tree can be computed
in c · d · η+ c2 · d · η+ · · ·+ cr · d · η ≤ cr · d · η · c
c−1 = O(c
r · d · η). This procedure has been summarized
in Algorithm 1. For an illustration, see Figure 1.
2.3 The Evaluation Phase. The verifier is interested in evaluating f(x) = a0+a1x+ · · ·+ad−1xd−1.
We assume that both f(·) and x are publicly known. The prover sends fˆ(x) to the verifier. If the prover
is honest, then fˆ(x) = f(x). Otherwise, it can be an arbitrary member of F. The prover also sends the
verifier fˆ (s)(x(1)) for all s ∈ [0 : η − 1], where x(1) = xη. The verifier checks whether
∑
s∈[0:η−1]
xsfˆ (s)(x(1)) = fˆ(x). (2.12)
If not, he rejects the result. Next, the verifier finds the polynomial gˆ(α, x(1)) of degree η − 1 (in α) by
interpolating the points (αs, fˆ
(s)(x(1))), s ∈ [0 : η − 1]. He then chooses b1 ∈ [0 : cη − 1] uniformly at
random and finds fˆ (b1)(x(1)) = gˆ(αbℓ , x
(1)). The verifier then sends b1 to the prover. Next, the prover
sends the verifier fˆ (b1,s)(x(2)) for all s ∈ [0 : η − 1] where x(2) = xη2 . The verifier checks if
∑
s∈[0:η−1]
xηsfˆ (b1,s)(x(2)) = fˆ (b1)(x(1)). (2.13)
If not, he rejects the result. The algorithm now proceeds with fˆ (b1)(x(1)) taking the role of fˆ(x). This
process continues until the prover sends the verifier hˆ(b1, · · · , br) = fˆ (b1,··· ,br)(x(r)). The verifier checks
1We are assuming that η grows at most polylogarithmically with d, so the complexity of computing Zi(αj) will be negligible
compared to the overall complexity of the initialization phase. More on the proper choice of η in Section 3.1.
a0 a1 a2 a3
a
(0)
0 a
(0)
1 a
(1)
0 a
(1)
1 a
(2)
0 a
(2)
1
a
(0,0)
0 a
(0,1)
0 a
(1,0)
0 a
(1,1)
0 a
(2,0)
0 a
(2,1)
0 a
(2,2)
0a
(1,2)
0a
(0,2)
0
Figure 1: Efficient computation of the look-up table. Each box represents one polynomial, starting with
f(x) = a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 + a3x
3 at the root. The circles within each box represent the coefficients of the
corresponding polynomial. Each edge is multiplied by Zi(αj) where j determines the color (red = 0,
blue = 1, green = 2) and i determines the style of the edge (solid for i = 0 and dashed for i = 1). The
two edges merging at each node are summed up to form the value of that node. At the base of the tree
we have h(b1, b2) = a
(b1,b2)
0 . In this example we have d = 4, η = 2, c =
3
2 .
this against the correct value of h(b1, · · · , br) stored in his look-up table. If they are not equal, the
result is rejected. To amplify the prover’s probability of failure, this entire algorithm is run m times.
If all the m experiments pass, the verifier accepts the result. We will see in Section 3 that the proper
choice of m is ( c
c−1)
r. This process has been summarized in Algorithm 2 and illustrated in Figure 2.
For notational simplicity, the algorithm is described as m consecutive rounds. But the m rounds can be
trivially parallelized to reduce the overall round complexity to r.
3 Performance Analysis
Completeness: If the prover is honest, he will provide the correct f(x) and the correct values of
f (b1,··· ,bℓ)(x(ℓ)) for all ℓ ∈ [1 : r] which will clearly pass all the verification tests.
(Information-theoretic) soundness: Soundness follows from the simple principle that two distinct
polynomials of degree η − 1 must disagree on at least (c− 1)η + 1 points on any set of size cη. Suppose
the prover starts by sending the verifier the wrong value of fˆ(x). In order to pass (2.12), he must then
provide the verifier with at least one wrong value fˆ (s)(x1). Because of this, the polynomial gˆ(α, x1), as a
function of α, will be distinct from the correct polynomial g(α, x1). Due to the observation above, these
two polynomials will differ on at least (c − 1)η + 1 members of L. Therefore, if b1 is chosen uniformly
at random over [0 : cη − 1], the value of fˆ (b1)(x1) = gˆ(αb1 , x1) will be different from the correct value
f (b1)(x1) with probability at least
c−1
c
. With high probability, the error continues to propagate through
the interactions between the verifier and the prover, until it reaches level r, at which point, the verifier
can detect it by checking it against its stored value h(b1, · · · , br). The probability that an adversarial
prover can successfully pass all the verifications is bounded by
p ≤ 1
c
+
c− 1
c
· 1
c
+ (
c− 1
c
)2 · 1
c
+ · · ·+ ·(c− 1
c
)r−1 · 1
c
= 1− (1− 1
c
)r. (3.14)
f (0)(y) = a0 + a2y f (1)(y) = a1 + a3y f (2)(y) = Z0(α2)f (0)(y) + Z1(α2)f (1)(y) f (3)(y) = Z0(α3)f (0)(y) + Z1(α3)f (1)(y)
f (2,2)(z) = Z0(α2)f (2,0)(z) + Z1(α2)f (2,1)(z)
f (2,3)(z) = Z0(α3)f (2,0)(z) + Z1(α3)f (2,1)(z)
f (2,0)(z) = a0Z0(α2) + a1Z1(α2)
f (2,1)(z) = a2Z0(α2) + a3Z1(α2)
f(x) = a0 + a1x+ a2x2 + a3x3
y = x2
z = y2
f (0)(y) + xf (1)(y)
?
= f(x)
f (2,0)(z) + yf (2,1)(z)
?
= f (2)(y)
a0Z0(α0)Z0(α0) + a1Z0(α0)Z1(α0)
+a2Z1(α0)Z0(α0) + a3Z1(α0)Z1(α0)
a0Z0(α1)Z0(α0) + a1Z0(α1)Z1(α0)
+a2Z1(α1)Z0(α0) + a3Z1(α1)Z1(α0) +a2Z1(α2)Z0(α0) + a3Z1(α2)Z1(α0) +a2Z1(α3)Z0(α0) + a3Z1(α3)Z1(α0)
a0Z0(α2)Z0(α0) + a1Z0(α2)Z1(α0) a0Z0(α3)Z0(α0) + a1Z0(α3)Z1(α0)
a0Z0(α2)Z0(α1) + a1Z0(α2)Z1(α1)
a0Z0(α2)Z0(α2) + a1Z0(α2)Z1(α2)
a0Z0(α2)Z0(α3) + a1Z0(α2)Z1(α3)
a0Z0(α1)Z0(α1) + a1Z0(α1)Z1(α1)
a0Z0(α1)Z0(α2) + a1Z0(α1)Z1(α2)
a0Z0(α1)Z0(α3) + a1Z0(α1)Z1(α3)
a0Z0(α0)Z0(α2) + a1Z0(α0)Z1(α2)
a0Z0(α0)Z0(α1) + a1Z0(α0)Z1(α1)
a0Z0(α0)Z0(α3) + a1Z0(α0)Z1(α3)
a0Z0(α3)Z0(α2) + a1Z0(α3)Z1(α2)
a0Z0(α3)Z0(α1) + a1Z0(α3)Z1(α1)
a0Z0(α3)Z0(α3) + a1Z0(α3)Z1(α3)
+a2Z1(α3)Z0(α2) + a3Z1(α3)Z1(α2)
+a2Z1(α3)Z0(α3) + a3Z1(α3)Z1(α3)
+a2Z1(α3)Z0(α1) + a3Z1(α3)Z1(α1)
+a2Z1(α2)Z0(α3) + a3Z1(α2)Z1(α3)+a2Z1(α1)Z0(α3) + a3Z1(α1)Z1(α3)+a2Z1(α0)Z0(α3) + a3Z1(α0)Z1(α3)
+a2Z1(α2)Z0(α1) + a3Z1(α2)Z1(α1)
+a2Z1(α1)Z0(α2) + a3Z1(α1)Z1(α2)+a2Z1(α0)Z0(α2) + a3Z1(α0)Z1(α2)
+a2Z1(α1)Z0(α1) + a3Z1(α1)Z1(α1)+a2Z1(α0)Z0(α1) + a3Z1(α0)Z1(α1)
+a2Z1(α2)Z0(α2) + a3Z1(α2)Z1(α2)
?
=
Figure 2: An illustration of the proposed algorithm. The blue values are provided by the prover. The
red boxed values are computed by the verifier after interpolating the blue values at the same level. The
verifier checks whether consecutive levels of the tree are consistent (identities marked by
?
=). At the
lowest level, the boxed red value is compared against a pre-computed look-up table. In this example we
have d = 4, η = 2, c = 2.
Algorithm 2 Interactive Verifiable Polynomial Evaluation, Verifier’s Protocol
Input: x, η, c, d, Zi,j for i ∈ [0 : η − 1], j ∈ [0 : cη − 1] and the look-up table h.
Output: One bit, accept or reject
1: r = ⌈ log dlog η⌉.
2: fˆ () =Input().
3: for i ∈ [1 : m] do
4: for ℓ ∈ [1 : r] do
5: fˆ (b1,··· ,bℓ−1,s) =Input() for all s ∈ [0 : η − 1].
6: if fˆ (b1,··· ,bℓ−1) 6= ∑s∈[0:η−1] xsfˆ (b1,··· ,bℓ−1,s) then
7: return reject.
8: end if
9: Choose bℓ ∼Uniform([0 : cη − 1]) and reveal bℓ to the prover.
10: Compute fˆ (b1,··· ,bℓ) =
∑
s∈[0:η−1] Zs,bℓ fˆ
(b1,··· ,bℓ−1,s).
11: Set x = xη.
12: end for
13: if fˆ (b1,··· ,br) 6= h(b1, · · · , br) then
14: return reject.
15: end if
16: end for
17: return accept.
The verifier proceeds to run the experiment m times and rejects the result if any of the m experiments
fail. We want to choose m such that pm < 1/2. By choosing m = ( c
c−1)
r, we will have
pm = (1− 1
m
)m <
1
e
<
1
2
. (3.15)
Computational Complexity of the Initialization: Based on the analysis in Section 2.2.1, the
initialization phase can be done in time
Cini = O(c
log d
log η · d · η). (3.16)
Computational Complexity of the Verifier: The verifier runs m (parallel) experiments, each
consisting of r rounds. Each round takes O(η) operations. Therefore, the overall complexity of the
verifier is
Cver = O(m · r · η) = O(η · ( c
c− 1)
log d
log η · log d
log η
). (3.17)
Computational Complexity of the Prover: An honest prover can also pre-compute the coefficients
of the polynomials f (b1,··· ,bℓ)(x) in its own initialization phase and store them locally in order to reduce
its complexity. In round ℓ, the prover must evaluate η polynomials each of degree d
ηℓ
. Therefore, the
prover only needs to perform m(d+ d
η
· η + d
η2
· η + · · ·+ d
ηr
· η) ≤ m · d · 2η
η−1 = O(m · d) computation 2.
Cpro = O(m · d) = O(d · ( c
c− 1)
log d
log η ). (3.18)
2Even in the absence of an initialization phase for the prover, the complexity remains O(m ·d ·η) for each of the r rounds, resulting
in an overall complexity of O(m · d · η · r). This is still of the form O(d1+ǫ) for the choice of η and c in Section 3.1.
Round Complexity of the Algorithm: As mentioned in Section 2.3, we can run all them experiments
in parallel. As a result, the round complexity of the algorithm is only
Crnd = log d
log η
. (3.19)
3.1 The Proper Choice of the Parameters. We have two parameters to play with, namely c and
η. Firstly, we want to make sure that the initialization phase can be done in O(d1+ǫ). For this purpose,
we choose η = (log d)ω for an arbitrary real number ω > 0. We also fix c ∈ R, c > 1 to be a constant.
To see why Cini = O(d1+ǫ), note that
Cini = cr · η · d = c
log d
log η · η · d = d log cω log log d · d · (log d)ω = O(d1+ log cω log log d ).
Our second criterion is to achieve Cver = O(dǫ). This requirement is automatically satisfied with the
above choices of η and c.
Cver = O(η · ( c
c− 1)
log d
log η · log d
log η
) = O(d
b
log log d · (log d)
ω+1
ω log log d
) = O(d
b
log log d ), (3.20)
where b = 1
ω
· log c
c−1 is a constant. Finally, the complexity of the prover is given by
Cpro = O(d · ( c
c− 1)
log d
log η ) = O(d1+
b
log log d ), (3.21)
and the round complexity is
Crnd = log d
log η
= O(log d). (3.22)
4 Discussion: Extending the Results to Multivariate Polynomials
Consider an n-variate polynomial of degree d− 1 in each variable
f(x1, · · · , xn) =
∑
i1∈[0:d−1]
· · ·
∑
in∈[0:d−1]
ai1,··· ,in
∏
j∈[1:n]
x
ij
j . (4.23)
A verifier wishes to evaluate this polynomial at (x1, · · · , xn) with the help of a prover. A simple variation
of Algorithm 2 can be used for this purpose. First, the verifier treats f(x1, · · · , xn) as a univariate
polynomial in x1 and applies Algorithm 2 in order to reduce the degree of x1 to zero after r =
log d
log η
interactions with the prover. Now, he is left with a new polynomial that only has n− 1 variables. After
n · r rounds, the number of variables will reduce to zero, and the verifier will be left with a constant that
he can check against a look-up table of size (c · η)nr. It is easy to see that if we resort to this modified
algorithm, all the results in Section 3 will remain valid, except d must be replaced with dn (the number
of terms in f(x1, · · · , xn)). For instance, the complexity of the verifier will be
Cver,n = O(d
bn
log n+log log d ) (4.24)
and the complexity of the prover will be
Cpro,n = O(d1+
bn
log n+log log d ) (4.25)
It is also noteworthy that any improvements in the multivariate case directly translates to a better
univariate algorithm. To see why, consider an arbitrary univariate polynomial g(x) of degree dn − 1.
Without loss of generality, we can represent this polynomial as
g(x) =
∑
i1∈[0:d−1]
· · ·
∑
in∈[0:d−1]
ai1,··· ,inx
i1+i2d+···+indn−1 = f(x, xd, · · · , xdn−1). (4.26)
Applying Algorithm 2 on g(x) results in a verifier complexity of O(d
bn
log n+log log d ) which is the same as
Cver,n. If we can design an n−variate algorithm that achieves a verifier complexity smaller than Cver,n,
we can apply it on f(x, xd, · · · , xdn−1) and improve upon the complexity of Algorithm 2 applied on g(x).
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